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INTRODUCTION
Lenity and bankruptcy are not terms often found in close company. Lenity
is a rule of statutory construction used to interpret criminal laws;' bankruptcy
refers to our civil system of debt relief and financial reorganization.2 Yet
modem bankruptcy's origins lie in criminal law, and descendants of those first
criminal statutes appear in federal criminal law today.3
Lenity appears to be developing a similar dual character. In two recent
cases, the Supreme Court has used lenity to assist it in the interpretation of
statutes in civil contexts.4 Although no court has yet extended lenity to
interpretations of civil bankruptcy, such an extension is not fanciful. In
addition, there might appear to be some benefits. Such an extension would
provide an opportunity to once again unite civil and criminal bankruptcy, and
could create a close interpretive relationship between the two.
This would be disastrous. Although the two sides of bankruptcy share
common terms and concepts, they have wholly different functions. Civil
bankruptcy provides for collective proceedings which focus on debt relief and
restructuring and on the allocation of the burden this relief imposes.5 It
imposes shared sacrifice-through debt discharge 6 -to promote an individ-
ual's or an organization's return to productivity.7 To be sure, civil bankruptcy
attempts to exclude the unworthy; those who give false oaths during their
bankruptcy proceedings and those who hide assets from their trustees, for
example, do not receive the benefits of debt forgiveness.8
Those who make false oaths and hide assets in civil bankruptcy proceedings
can also be jailed.9 But not all acts which result in a denial of discharge lead
1. See generally Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 168 (1990); United States v. Williams,
458 U.S. 279, 290 (1982); McElroy v. United States, 455 U.S. 642, 657 (1982); United States v. Bass,
404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971).
2. Bankruptcy law is codified in Title 11 of the United States Code. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330
(1988).
3. See I COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 7A.01 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1993) [hereinafter
COLLIER].
4. United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 112 S. Ct. 2102 (1992); Crandon, 494 U.S. 152.
5. A large amount of literature explores the nature of the bankruptcy process. See Barry E. Adler,
Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311 (1993);
Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI.
L. REv. 815 (1987); Richard E. Flint, Bankruptcy Policy: Toward a Moral Justification for Financial
Rehabilitation of the Consumer Debtor, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 515 (1991); Thomas H. Jackson,
Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982);
Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing
and the Creditors' Bargain, 75 VA. L. REv. 155 (1989); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U.
CHI. L. REv. 775 (1987). See generally H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220-41, 383-85 (1977)
(reorganizations); id at 383-85 (distributive aim and individual discharge).
6. 11 U.S.C. §§ 727, 1141, 1228, 1328.
7. See generally NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984) ("The fundamental
purpose of reorganization is to prevent a debtor from going into liquidation, with an attendant loss of
jobs and possible misuse of economic resources."); United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198,
203 (1983); Charles J. Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 325 (1991).
8. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2), (4).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 152 (1988).
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to criminal liability, and criminal liability may exist even in the absence of
creditor prejudice. Unlike the collective proceeding present in a civil
bankruptcy, which attempts to accommodate all parties to a particular case of
financial distress, criminal bankruptcy positions the state against the
individual. In short, criminal bankruptcy cares little for the effects or results
in any particular civil case, while those effects and results are the primary
goal of the civil side of bankruptcy.10
An uncritical extension of the doctrine of lenity to the interpretation of the
Bankruptcy Code could blur these distinctions in ways which would distort
and frustrate the aims of both criminal and civil bankruptcy. Civil bankruptcy
could suffer from too narrow an interpretation of key concepts; criminal
bankruptcy could become unnecessarily complex. As a result, I argue against
this extension.
This Article first examines the doctrine of lenity and the Court's recent
extensions of it to civil contexts. It next reviews in detail the points of
intersection between civil and criminal bankruptcy and analyzes possible
extensions of lenity to bankruptcy under the Court's recent decisions. These
extensions are then rejected as both untrue to the spirit of lenity and as
unwise tools to administer a civil or a criminal bankruptcy system.
At the heart of this rejection is the assertion that it is wise to interpret terms
and concepts common to both criminal and civil bankruptcy differently in
each context. In short, it rejects the proposition that the statutes should be
read in pari materia. The Article concludes with some observations regarding
the proper intersection of criminal and civil bankruptcy.
I. LENITY
As traditionally understood, lenity is a doctrine of statutory interpretation
that directs a court to prefer a narrow reading of an ambiguous penal
statute. So stated, the doctrine appears disarmingly simple. In the case of
ambiguity, assess the defendant's conduct against the narrower reading of the
law. The Court, however, has disagreed over when to employ the doctrine,
how to determine ambiguity, and even what constitutes ambiguity. In light of
this confusion, a short examination of the doctrine is in order.
10. The relative numbers of case filings under each system tend to confirm this statement; for every
criminal bankruptcy case filed, approximately ten thousand civil bankruptcies are initiated. In fiscal year
1990, for example, 880,399 cases were commenced under Title 11. Ed X. Flynn, Bankruptcy by the
Numbers, ABI NEWSLETTER 16 (Feb. 1992). Most of these are voluntary filings initiated by debtors. Id.
In contrast, during that same period the government initiated only 89 prosecutions for bankruptcy
crimes. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATISTICAL REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 1990, REPORT 1-21 tbl.
3 (1991).
11. Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 168 (1990); United States v. Williams, 458 U.S. 279,
290 (1982); McElroy v. United States, 455 U.S. 642, 657 (1982); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336,
347 (1971); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971).
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A. History and Policies Served
The Court often refers to lenity as a "venerable" doctrine, 2 and has on
occasion offered no citation upon its invocation. 3 This acceptance may,
however, mask deep differences over the doctrine's scope.
At its core, lenity currently serves both due process and separation of
powers concerns. 4 Due process concerns are easy to articulate; a penal
statute, the violation of which can bring fines, incarceration, or both, should
be clear. Citizens should have notice of those activities which the state will
punish. Moreover, separation of powers concerns make clarity the legislature's
task. 5 The Court enforces this responsibility by not allowing activities which
are not proscribed by sufficiently clear statutory language to be punished.
United States v. Wiltberger6 is an early example of the policies underlying
the rule of lenity. Wiltberger was a master of an American vessel trading in
China. He killed a seaman in his charge under circumstances that Congress
had labelled manslaughter if done on "the high seas."' 17 The problem,
however, was that when Wiltberger killed the seaman the boat they were both
on was:
in the river Tigris, in the empire of China, off Wampoa, and about 100
yards from the shore, in four and a half fathoms water, and below the low
water mark, thirty-five miles above the mouth of the river .... At the
mouth of the Tigris, the government of China has forts on each side of the
river, where customhouse officers are taken in by foreign vessels to prevent
smuggling. The river at the mouth, and at Wampoa, is about half a mile in
breadth.'"
12. Smith v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2050, 2059 (1993); United States v. R.L.C., 112 S. Ct. 1329,
1338 (1992); Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 131 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Even as early
as 1820, Chief Justice Marshall referred to the interpretive rule that a criminal statute should be strictly
construed as an "ancient maxim." United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820); see
also United States v. Lacher, 134 U.S. 624, 628 (1890). The "ancient maxim" seems to have been
grounded in the amelioration of capital punishment for all felonies. G.A. ENDLICH, A COMMENTARY ON
THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES § 329 (1888).
13. See, e.g., Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83-84 (1955); United States v. Universal C.I.T.
Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221-22 (1952).
14. E.g., Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 112 (1979) ("This practice reflects not merely a
convenient maxim of statutory construction. Rather, it is rooted in fundamental principles of due process
which mandate that no individual be forced to speculate, at peril of indictment, whether his conduct is
prohibited."); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-48 (1971) ("This principle is founded on two
policies that have long been part of our tradition. First, 'a fair warning should be given to the world in
language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is
passed. To make the warning fair, so fair as possible the line should be clear.") (citations omitted);
McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25 (1931).
15. See, e.g., Bass, 404 U.S. at 348 ("This principle is founded on two policies that have long been
part of our tradition.... Second, because of the seriousness of criminal penalties, and because criminal
punishment usually represents the moral condemnation of the community, legislatures and not courts
should define criminal activity. This policy embodies 'the instinctive distastes against men languishing
in prison unless the lawmaker has clearly said they should."') (citations omitted).
16. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76 (1820).
17. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 12.
18. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 77.
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Wiltberger argued that this was not the high seas. 9
The same statute which punished manslaughter only on the high seas
criminalized murder and robbery on the high seas and "in any river, haven,
basin, or bay, out of the jurisdiction of any particular state."2 Had this later
section been inserted in the manslaughter section of the statute, a conviction
was assured because the Tigris was a "river ... out of the jurisdiction of any
particular State." The government argued that this jurisdictional extension
should have been read into the manslaughter provision, it being "within the
intention and reason [of Congress, thus,] it must be considered as within the
letter of the statute."'" The government also asserted that because Congress
had passed the statute "on the first organization of the government," it must
have intended to exercise the admiralty powers to the fullest extent, and to
punish all crimes of equal repugnance-manslaughter and murder meeting this
test-within that jurisdiction.2 2
Chief Justice Marshall focused on the jurisdictional issue. He first noted
that a river thirty-five miles inland was not, in common parlance, the "high
seas."23 In addition, it was not the "high seas" as understood at common
law.24 These two conclusions brought him to the government's main point:
that it would be incongruous to exempt manslaughter from the statute's
jurisdictional reach when murder and robbery were not. But on this point,
Marshall was firm. He stated:
The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps not
much less old than construction itself. It is founded on the tenderness of
the law for the rights of individuals; and on the plain principle that the
power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial
department. It is the legislature, not the Court, which is to define a crime,
and ordain its punishment.25
This passage captures most of lenity's subtleties and controversies. It begins
with what today we would call due process concerns; Chief Justice Marshall
used the phrase the "tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals.
This due process point is quickly followed by a structural point: an acknowl-
edgement that the definition of crimes is, in our system, legislative.27
The next paragraph, however, is more interesting for what it tells us about
the content of the rule. Here, Marshall outlines a procedure for employing
lenity, which is worth reprinting at length:
19. Id. at 86-87.
20. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 8.
21. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 91.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 94.
24. Id. at 106-16.
25. Id. at 95.
26. Id.
27. Id. Wiltberger was decided soon after the Court had held that there were no federal common
law crimes. United States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415 (1816); United States v. Hudson &
Goodwin, I1 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
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It is said, that notwithstanding this rule, the intention of the law maker
must govern in the construction of penal, as well as other statutes. This is
true. But this is not a new independent rule which subverts the old. It is a
modification of the ancient maxim, and amounts to this, that though penal
laws are to be construed strictly, they are not to be construed so strictly as
to defeat the obvious intention of the legislature. The maxim is not to be
so applied as to narrow the words of the statute to the exclusion of cases
which those words, in their ordinary acceptation, or in that sense in which
the legislature has obviously used them, would comprehend. The intention
of the legislature is to be collected from the words they employ. Where
there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction. The
case must be a strong one indeed, which would justify a Court in departing
from the plain meaning of words, especially in a penal act, in search of an
intention which the words themselves did not suggest. To determine that
a case is within the intention of a statute, its language must authorise us to
say so. It would be dangerous, indeed, to carry the principle, that a case
which is within the reason or mischief of a statute, is within its provisions,
so far as to punish a crime not enumerated in the statute, because it is of
equal atrocity, or of kindred character, with those which are enumerated.28
As a result, Marshall declined to find jurisdiction. Wiltberger went free,
with Marshall acknowledging that had Wiltberger murdered or robbed he
would have been jailed.29
Marshall's interpretive plan which leads to this somewhat anomalous
result 0 seems simple. Start first, he indicates, with the words of the statute.
Lenity applies only if there is some doubt after reading these words: "[w]here
there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction."
3 1
What can legitimately be cited in an effort to demonstrate ambiguity? On this
point, the opinion is less clear. It seems to indicate that we can look to the
"ordinary acceptation" of the words used, and possibly to a different sense if
"the legislature has obviously used them" in that different sense.
32
Do we get to look to more? The opinion is silent on this point, although it
does state that "[t]o determine that a case is within the intention of a statute,
28. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 95-96.
29. Id. at 105.
30. Seemingly hypertechnical results such as those in Wiltberger may be one of lenity's legacies.
An early example illustrates this point. In 1547, Parliament passed a law making the "stealing of horses,
geldings or mares" a felony without benefit of clergy. An Acte for the Repeale of Certaine Statutes
Concerninge Treasons, Felonyes, &c, 1 Edw. 6, ch. 12, § 9 (1547) (text modernized). But what of the
theft of just one horse? Apparently, some judge believed that the statute, being in the plural, did not
cover the situation. In the very next year, Parliament passed an amendment to the statute depriving the
benefit of clergy from "all and singular person and persons feloniously taking or stealing any horse,
gelding or mare." An Acte that no Man Stealinge Horse or Horses Shall Enjoye the Benefit of His
Clergie, 2 & 3 Edw. 6, ch. 33 (1548) (text modernized). The preamble to this legislation noted that it
was necessary "[flor as much as it is and hath been ambiguous and doubtful, upon the words mentioned
[in the prior act) is due form of the law [to have been] found guilty or otherwise attainted or convicted
for felonious stealing of one horse, gelding or mare .... Id. (text modernized). For other examples,
see FORTUNATUS DwARRIs, A GENERAL TREATISE ON STATUTES: THEIR RULES OF CONSTRUCTION, AND
THE PROPER BOUNDARIES OF LEGISLATION AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 246-47 (Platt Potter ed.,
1885).
31. Willberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 95-96.
32. Id.
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its language must authorise us to say so."33 A little of what Marshall means
by this can be illuminated by his method. Most of Wiltberger is a close
textual examination of the act in which the disputed statute was found.34
Marshall attempts to glean from the drafting of other sections of the same act
the meaning or the application of the disputed section.
Marshall had employed this method before. In United States v. Fisher,"
a federal statute accorded debts owed to the United States priority whenever
"any revenue officer or other person, hereafter becoming indebted to the
United States" became insolvent.36 The insolvent person in Fisher was not
a revenue officer; he was an indorser of a foreign bill of exchange which the
United States had purchased.37 As such, he did seem to be, however, an
"other person." The argument against priority was that the title of the act was
limited to "receivers of public money" and that the first four (out of five)
sections of the act could not apply to the type of insolvent person present
before the court.35
Marshall's method in Fisher was similar to that which he would later
employ in Wiltberger. He undertook a close examination of each provision of
the statute in question, both independently and in relation to the rest of the
statute.39 But he also went further. He looked to the purpose of the stat-
ute,40 to other similar statutes, 4' as well as to the title of the act.42 His
reasoning for this method was to be echoed later in Wiltberger:
Where the intent is plain, nothing is left to construction. Where the
mind labours to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes every thing
from which aid can be derived; and in such case the title claims a degree
of notice, and will have its due share of consideration.43
B. Current Readings
Wiltberger's focus on language seems sufficiently specific to guide future
applications of lenity once ambiguity is agreed to be present. But although it
33. Id. at 96.
34. Id. at 96-102.
35: Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358 (1805).
36. Id. at 385.
37. Fisher was the assignee of one Blight, a bankrupt under the 1800 Bankruptcy Act. Blight, prior
to his bankruptcy, had endorsed a bill of exchange (probably what we would today call a check) to a
person who then sold it (presumably in return for some equivalent consideration) by endorsing it to the
United States. Id. at 370. Under the law of commercial paper then and now extant, Blight became liable
to the United States (along with all other endorsers and the original drawer) upon dishonor of the bill
of exchange. See U.C.C. § 3-415(a) (1991).
38. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 386-87.
39. Id. at 388-89.
40. Id. at 389-90.
41. Id. at 391-94.
42. Id. at 386.
43. Id.
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governs most cases-and approves of idiosyncratic results in the pro-
cess 44-it leaves open how we are to determine plain meaning or the
"different sense" of the legislature. In many cases, the Court dismisses claims
of ambiguity with little more than the assertion that the claim is frivolous or
not well taken.45 In other cases, however, the Court seems to struggle with
claims of ambiguity. Much of this stress centers around the appropriate
context within which to read a statute.46
Most cases agree with Chief Justice Marshall's belief that context can make
meaning plain; or, as he put it, "ordinary acceptation" is an appropriate
context. But simply stating that a statute's meaning is plain is rarely
dispositive. Smith v. United States47 provides a recent example of a plain
meaning debate. At issue in Smith was whether a person "uses ... a firearm"
"during and in relation to" a drug transaction-resulting in an enhanced
sentence-if the gun was part of the consideration for an exchange for drugs,
rather than a tool for the enforcement of one side's terms. 8 The Court found
that "plain meaning" captured "use" as a medium of consideration, and
approved the greater punishment.4 9 In dissent were Justices Scalia, Souter,
and Stevens, who saw the issue differently; in their view, so long as the
proper interpretation is "eminently debatable," lenity applies.5
The Court's decisions also recognize specialized meaning; that is, the use
of terms of art known to lawyers but not necessarily to the public at large.
Examples of this type of meaning are the Court's treatment of Congress' use
of elements of common law crimes in statutes without defining such elements.
Thus, the Court has divided over whether the common law of forgery labelled
44. See supra note 30.
45. See, e.g., Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 409-10 (1991); Chapman v. United
States, 11l S. Ct. 1919, 1929 (1991); United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475,484 (1984); United States
v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 379 (1978); Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 839-42 (1974).
46. The point here is the old one that context matters to meaning. Take, for example, a statute that
states, "Whoever takes property of a value greater than $1000 from a bank without authorization or
approval shall be fined $5000 and imprisoned for 5 years." Upon first reading, this may appear to be
a prohibition on robbery or embezzlement from financial institutions. But what if the statute appeared
in Title 42 as part of an environmental law designed to save the nation's river resources?
47. Smith, 1-13 S. Ct. 2050 (1993).
48. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
49. Smith, 113 S. Ct. at 2060. In rejecting the dissent's claim that juxtaposition of "use" with
"firearm" excluded "use" as consideration, the Court noted that "[I]anguage, of course, cannot be
interpreted apart from context. The meaning of a word that appears ambiguous if viewed in isolation
may become clear when the word is analyzed in light of the terms that surround it." Id. at 2054.
50. Id. at 2063 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("That is enough, under the rule of lenity, to require finding
for the [defendant]."); see also Evans v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1881, 1900 (1992) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("Because the Court's expansive interpretation of the statute is not the only plausible one,
the rule of lenity compels adoption of the narrower interpretation."). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia joined Justice Thomas' dissent in Evans. Cf. Young v. Community Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974,
988 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (indicating that a statute is not "'unclear unless we think there are
decent arguments for each of the two competing interpretations of it."' (quoting RONALD DWORKIN,
LAw's EMPIRE 352 (1986))).
The dissenters in Smith also agreed that context was important. "It is ... a 'fundamental principle
of statutory construction (and, indeed, of language itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be
determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is used."' Smith, 113 S. Ct. at
2060-61 (quoting Deal v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1993, 1996 (1993)).
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as "falsely made" documents that were genuine on their face but which
incorporated false information,"' has disagreed over whether writing a check
on an account with insufficient funds constitutes making a false statement,52
and has disagreed over whether Congress' use of "burglary" incorporated all
of the common law elements. 3
In each of these cases, issues of appropriate context and fair meaning arise
as the result of the arguments of the advocates.5 4 Partially as a consequence
of the ease with which a clever mind can create disparate readings of a
particular text, most cases are consistent with the proposition that it is an
insufficient ground for ambiguity that a litigant or some other judge has
produced two plausible readings." Beyond that, however, there is little
common ground over the path to the application of lenity.
C. Extension to Civil Contexts
This confusion in criminal cases threatens to spill over into civil areas. Two
recent cases, Crandon v. United States5 6 and United States v. Thomp-
son/Center Arms Co.,5  explicitly apply lenity to cases arising in civil
contexts. At issue in Crandon was whether the government could recover, in
a civil suit, compensation allegedly paid illegally to government employees.
Thompson/Center involved the definition, for taxing and registration purposes,
of a firearm. In both cases, the terms construed were also found in cognate
criminal statutes, so the Courts believed that their construction of the terms
involved would have implications for future criminal cases.5
In Crandon five individuals had left Boeing to join the Reagan Administra-
tion. Before they officially became government employees, Boeing paid each
51. Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103 (1990).
52. United States v. Williams, 458 U.S. 279 (1982).
53. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990).
54. The debate over appropriate meaning has resulted in minor acrimony. After all, if a case turns
on whether Justice X or Justice Y agrees with the argument that some specified text is ambiguous, the
dispute goes beyond the case before the Court and into particular Justices' command of English. An
example of this type of dispute can be found in Deal, 113 S. Ct. 1993. There, Justice Stevens in his
dissent accused the majority of "sentence-parsing." Id. at 2004 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Writing for the
majority, Justice Scalia characterized Stevens' comments as containing "a degree of verbal know-
nothingism that would render government by legislation impossible .... [I]n the context at issue here,
it is entirely clear without any 'sentence-parsing' that [our view is correct]." Id. at 1998; see also United
States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 76 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (characterizing the argument for
the existence of ambiguity as "sparsely supported.").
55. Moskal, 498 U.S. at 108; United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 484 (1984); McElroy v.
United States, 455 U.S. 642, 657-58 (1982).
56. Crandon, 494 U.S. 152 (1990).
57. Thompson/Center, 112 S. Ct. 2102 (1992).
58. Crandon, 494 U.S. at 158 ("[B]ecause the governing standard is set forth in a criminal statute,
it is appropriate to apply the rule of lenity in resolving any ambiguity in the ambit of the statute's cover-
age.'); Thompson/Center, 112 S. Ct. at 2109-10 ("The key to resolving the ambiguity lies in recognizing
that although it is a tax statute that we construe now in a civil setting, the [National Firearms Act) has
criminal applications that carry no additional requirement of willflulness .... Making a firearm without
approval may be subject to criminal sanction, as is possession of an unregistered firearm and failure to
pay the tax on one, 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861, 5871. It is proper, therefore, to apply the rule of lenity and
resolve the ambiguity in Thompson/Center's favor.").
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of the five a lump sum payment "to mitigate the substantial financial loss
each employee expected to suffer by reason of his change in employment. 59
The aggregate amount of the payments made was $485,000.60 The govern-
ment sought to recover that amount from Boeing, relying on § 209(a) of the
Federal Criminal Code which makes illegal the payment or acceptance of
supplemental compensation for government service. 6' It also sought to
impose a constructive trust on the payments in the hands of the individuals.62
Its pretext for these recoveries was a simple common law civil suit for the
disgorgement of property received in contravention of law.63
The government did not initiate a criminal action, although the govern-
ment's recovery largely depended on a finding that the payment and receipt
of the funds violated the criminal statute. 64 The defense disputed that any
crime had occurred, noting that § 209(a) was silent as to when the prohibition
accrued. Because, they argued, all payments were made and accepted before
the individuals entered government service, the defendants committed no
crime.
The Court's opinion primarily reviews the history and purpose of § 209.65
This review left the Court with the impression that such payments were not
criminal because the limitation had not been applicable when the payments
were made or received. The Court could have stopped at this point. "To the
extent that any ambiguity over the temporal scope of § 209(a) remains, '"66
it invoked lenity as a canon of construction, because "the governing standard
is set forth in a criminal statute. '67 As the Court saw it, application of lenity
in this civil context "ensure[d] both that there is a fair warning of the
boundaries of criminal conduct, and that legislatures, not courts, define
criminal liability.
68
Thompson/Center also involved a civil case. There, Thompson/Center
packaged a pistol with a kit that could transform the pistol into a long-
barrelled rifle. The production of pistols and long-barrelled rifles are
nontaxable events, and the guns thus produced do not need to be registered.69
The problem was that a partial conversion-use of the kit's shoulder stock but
not its new gun barrel-produced a short-barrelled rifle. In contrast to pistols
59. Crandon, 494 U.S. at 154.
60. Id. at 155.
61. Id. at 156.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 158. Nothing in § 209 authorizes civil damages actions. The government proceeded on
the theory that receipt of illegal payments violated fiduciary or statutory duties embodied in § 209, and
that such payments could thus be disgorged. Although the Court believed that proof of violation of §
209 was essential, id., that conclusion does not necessarily follow. Although a violation of § 209 could
also be said to be a violation of a fiduciary duty to the United States-the converse is not true.
Fiduciary duties exist which do not have criminal implications if breached.
65. Id. at 158-64.
66. Id. at 168.
67. Id. at 158.
68. Id. (citations omitted).
69. United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 112 S. Ct. 2102, 2104 (1992).
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and long-barrelled rifles, the production of a short-barrelled rifle is taxable
and the maker of each such gun has to register it before sale."0 The
government notified Thompson/Center that the sale of the package was subject
to tax and regulation under the National Firearms Act.7' Thompson/Center
responded by paying the tax on one package, and then immediately suing for
a refund.72
A subsidiary issue, but one not directly in issue since the government did
not seek an indictment, was that one who "makes" but does not register a
short-barrelled rifle commits a felony for which lack of willfulness or
knowledge is not a defense.73
The Court saw the issue as whether Thompson/Center could be said to have
"ma[de]" the regulated rifle as prohibited by the National Firearms Act when
it provided the parts which could be used to create either a regulated gun or
an unregulated gun, but not both.74 Its review of the National Firearms Act
left it with no clear answer. Since the term "makes" appears in both the
civil and criminal statutes, the Court then employed lenity to resolve
ambiguities in Thompson/Center's favor.7" The Court felt this application of
lenity appropriate since the criminal statute involved did not incorporate any
requirement of willfulness or knowledge; if Thompson/Center did "make[]"
a regulated firearm, the only thing preventing a conviction after the decision
would be the running of the applicable statute of limitations or the exercise
of prosecutorial discretion not to prosecute.77
Although Thompson/Center cites Crandon, the citation does no more than
compound the problem through repetition without analysis.7" Both cases
seemingly rely on the happenstance of cognate criminal statutes to invoke
lenity.79 Absent from either case is any articulated justification for the
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2105.
72. Id.
73. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(f), 5871 (1986). The Court also referred to the relaxation of the specific
intent standard for the crime of willful failure to pay any taxes related to such "making." Thomp-
son/Center, 112 S. Ct. at 2109-10.
74. Thompson/Center, 112 S. Ct. at 2106.
75. Id. at 2109.
76.Id. at 2110.
77. Id. Justices Scalia and Thomas concurred on the lenity issue, but believed that the ambiguity
arose from considerations different from those the Court identified. Id. at 2110-12 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). Justice Stevens dissented, stating that "[i]f this were a criminal case in which the defendant
did not have adequate notice of the Government's interpretation of an ambiguous statute, then it would
be appropriate to apply the rule of lenity." Id. at 2113 (Stevens, 3., dissenting). He recognized the
difference between criminal sanctions and civil regulation, stating that regulation of concealed firearms
"is a field that has long been subject to pervasive government regulation .... The public interest in
carrying out the purposes that motivated enactment of the statute is, in my judgment and on this record,
far more compelling than a mechanical application of the rule of lenity." Id.
78. Id. at 2110 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Making a firearm without approval may be subject to
criminal sanction, as is possession of an unregistered firearm and failure to pay the tax on one, 26
U.S.C. §§ 5861, 5871. It is proper, therefore, to apply the rule of lenity and resolve the ambiguity in
Thompson/Center's favor. See Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 168[] (1990) (applying lenity
in interpreting a criminal statute invoked in a civil action)").
79. Thompson/Center, 112 S. Ct. at 2110 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The key to resolving the
ambiguity lies in recognizing that although it is a tax statute that we construe now in a civil setting, the
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extension of lenity to the civil case at issue. As Justice Stevens points out in
dissent in Crandon, none of lenity's concerns are implicated: "The risk that
this respondent would be the victim of [punishment without fair notice] is...
extremely remote.""0 Structural concerns are also absent. Given the broad
scope of firearms regulation, the Court is not in the position of creating new
regulation, but rather of consistently sorting out Congress' already pervasive
system. In short, the Court seems to use lenity not for its embodiment of due
process and structural concerns, but as a tie-breaker for tough issues.
This use of lenity as a mechanical method of resolving disputes might
initially seem consistent with lenity's due process and separation of powers
concerns. It answers the question, and in favor of the nongovernmental entity,
thereby forcing Congress to amend the statute to attain a different result. But
this mechanical resolution comes only after the Court engages in interpretation
and has found ambiguity. Thus the outcome can be determined by the
interpretive method chosen, but justified by resort to lenity's mechanical, tie-
breaking, application. The focus, then, should be on ways in which, or the
circumstances under which the Court finds ambiguity; and this is an area, as
shown below, in which the Court is deeply divided.
D. Current State of Lenity
After this review, what can be said about the current state of the rule of
lenity? As a starter, formulation of the doctrine of lenity is simple and
relatively noncontroversial. When a penal statute is ambiguous, construe it
narrowly. What is controversial, and not so simple, are the procedures used
to find ambiguity. At least five current members of the Court have endorsed
surprisingly subjective standards of ambiguity; for example, whether the
divergent readings are "eminently debatable" or "plausible."'8' These
differences seem to be over the appropriate context to use in determining
ambiguity. In one sense, the problem is like determining the proper perspec-
tive for creating a painting or photograph of a particular subject; where the
creator stands in relation to the subject-and how much background she
chooses to include-can affect the impression conveyed. A concrete example
might be the question of how to interpret the word "sanction" in a statute; it
can mean either to prohibit or to validate. Only context will aid in resolving
NFA has criminal applications that carry no additional requirement of willfulness.... Making a firearm
without approval may be subject to criminal sanction, as is possession of an unregistered firearm and
failure to pay the tax on one, 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861, 5871. It is proper, therefore, to apply the rule of lenity
and resolve the ambiguity in Thompson/Center's favor.'); Crandon, 494 U.S. at 158 ("[B]ecause the
governing standard is set forth in a criminal statute, it is appropriate to apply the rule of lenity in
resolving any ambiguity in the ambit of the statute's coverage.').
80. Thompson/Center, 112 S. Ct. at 2114 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
81. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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the dispute." The approach of the current Court can be seen as a mix of
approaches to the problem of context.83
Some justices focus on the text of the statute, their understanding of
English, and not much else. These justices focus on "plain meaning"; that is,
they use the perspective of a person unaided by history or by a lawyer. 84
They follow Chief Justice Marshall's deference in Wiltberger to the "ordinary
acceptation" of the statute's words. 8 In this effort, they use lenity's notice
function as a reason for not investigating context further; if a criminal
statute's true meaning can only be gleaned after significant research, then it
cannot provide the type of fair notice of the actions it condemns.
8 6
Occasionally, these and other justices will also look to the sense a term or
phrase carries in a specialized context, or in an independent system. Statutes
that incorporate words that held special status at common law may be
examples of this type of inquiry, 7 as may be environmental or health
statutes which incorporate scientific terms. Marshall recognized this type of
inquiry. He wrote of "that sense in which the legislature has obviously used"
the words in contradistinction to the "ordinary acceptation" of such words.88
Still other justices focus on the material and sources available to the
legislators who passed the statute in question. 9 These items include the
82. Cf Deal v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1993, 1996 (1993) ("There is not the slightest doubt, for
example, that § 924(c)(1), which deals with punishment in this world rather than the next, does not use
'conviction' to mean the state of being convicted of sin. Petitioner's contention overlooks, we think, this
fundamental principle of statutory construction (and, indeed, of language itself) that the meaning of a
word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is used.").
83. The Court is concerned with context outside the realm of lenity as well. See King v.-St.
Vincent's Hosp., 112 S. Ct. 570, 574 (1992) ("In so concluding we do nothing more, of course, than
follow the cardinal rule that a statute is to be read as a whole ... since the meaning of statutory
language, plain or not, depends on context."); Shell Oil Co. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 488 U.S. 19, 25
n.6 (1988) ("Words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition; they have only a communal existence; and
not only does the meaning of each interpenetrate the other, but all in their aggregate take their purport
from the setting in which they are used.. . .'); United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385, 396
(1868) (in construing statute, a court should adopt that sense of words which best harmonizes with
context and promotes policy and objectives of legislature). See generally WILLIAM D. PoPKIN,
MATERIALs ON LEGIsLATION: POLITICAL LANGUAGE AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS 55-63 (1993).
84. See United States v. R.L.C., 112 S. Ct. 1329, 1339-40 (1992) (Scalia & Thomas, JJ.,
concurring); Evans v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1881, 1899-1900 (1992) (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., and
Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
85. As captured by Justice Scalia:
'[T]he rule of lenity ensures that criminal statutes will provide fair warning concerning conduct
rendered illegal' ... . It may well be true that in most cases the proposition that the words of
the United States Code or the Statutes at Large give adequate notice to the citizen is something
of a fiction ... albeit one required in any system of law; but necessary fiction descends to
needless farce when the public is charged even with knowledge of Committee Reports.
R.L.C., 112 S. Ct. at 1340 (Scalia, J., concurring).
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., Evans, 112 S. Ct. 1881 (extortion); Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990)
(definition of burglary); United States v. Williams, 458 U.S. 279 (1982) (whether check drawn on
insufficient funds was a false statement under 18 U.S.C. § 1014); see also Commissioner v. Acker, 361
U.S. 87, 95 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
88. United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820).
89. See Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) ("We have always reserved lenity for
those situations in which a reasonable doubt persists about a statute's intended scope even after resort
to 'the language and structure, legislative history, and motivating policies' of the statute.") (quoting
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standard inventory of legislative history; conference and committee reports;
floor statements and other indicia of both the problem addressed and the
remedy selected.9"
Each of these approaches accepts that neither the existence of two or more
possible readings of a statute or splits in judicial authority, by themselves,
create ambiguity.9 Beyond that agreement, however, confusion exists over
when to stop the inquiry and declare ambiguity present.
The Court's recent dalliance with lenity in civil contexts can only serve to
increase this confusion. The Court seems to be willing to invoke lenity-and
thus adopt narrow construction-when the term or phrase involved appears in
both a civil and criminal statute and construction of the term in one context
will affect its construction in another. Thus, since it was essential to the
government's position in Crandon that a crime had been committed, the Court
invoked lenity. Similarly, in Thompson/Center, the Court believed that, given
the apparent lack of a culpable mental state in the cognate criminal statute,
construction of the term "makes" in a taxing and regulatory context would
spill over into construction of the same term in a criminal context. But neither
of these cases carefully and fully analyzes the reasons-other than the
presence of similar terms and concepts-for the extension of lenity outside the
criminal sphere.
II. THE SIMILARITIES BETWEEN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL BANKRUPTCY
The lack of a satisfactory analysis in Crandon and Thompson/Center raises
troubling issues for regulatory systems, such as bankruptcy, that have both
civil and criminal elements.92 The source of this trouble is that the common
terms and concepts of such systems are often central to their understanding
and administration. A review of the commonality present in civil and criminal
bankruptcy, and the common heritage which brought about that commonality,
demonstrates the critical nature of the key terms and concepts.
Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387 (1980)) (emphasis in original); see also Crandon v. United
States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990) ("In determining the meaning of the statute, we look not only to the
particular statutory language, but to the design of the statute as a whole and to its object and policy.");
Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 577 (1977).
90. See, e.g., Taylor, 495 U.S. 575.
91. Smith v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2050, 2059 (1993) ("The mere possibility of articulating a
narrower construction, however, does not by itself make the rule of lenity applicable."); Moskal, 498
U.S. at 108 (both); United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475 (1984) (litigants); McElroy v. United States,
455 U.S. 642 (1982) (judicial division).
92. The issue is particularly acute with bankruptcy in that there is no agency charged with
supervising or administering the Bankruptcy Code. In other areas, such as environmental law or taxation,
federal agencies have been accorded the ability to implement congressional policy, and have been given
wide latitude in carrying out the goal. See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 13.7.2 (1993). This Article does not explore the intersection of lenity and
administrative law. See Mark D. Alexander, Note, Increased Judicial Scrutiny for the Administrative
Crime, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 612 (1992).
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Present federal criminal law lists thirteen bankruptcy crimes spread across
five sections of the Criminal Code.93 These crimes have a long heritage; they
trace at least back to an English statute passed in 1542. 94 American law for
the most part adopted principles inherent inthe English system for both civil
and criminal bankruptcy. 9s Indeed, prior to 1948, the current bankruptcy
crimes statute was located in title 11, along with the civil provisions relating
to bankruptcy. 96 Indeed, the current bankruptcy crimes statute was enacted
as part of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act.9
The current federal criminal bankruptcy statutes share several terms and
concepts with civil bankruptcy which reflect this common heritage. These
common terms are some of the most basic to both systems; they include the
definitions of "property of the estate," "transfer," and others. The common
concepts are also central; the acts condemned in § 152 are essentially the
grounds for the denial of a discharge and of a fraudulent transfer.9" These
similarities are explored below.
A. The Common Terms
As might be expected, the terms common to both civil and criminal
bankruptcy define or affect core concepts. As a consequence, if lenity or any
othei doctrine is improperly used to construe them, there are potentially far-
reaching effects.
1. Estate Property
Since bankruptcy involves the debtor-creditor relationship, it is no mystery
that conceptions of property are critical to the administration of both civil and
criminal bankruptcy. On the civil side, the Bankruptcy Code broadly defines
what property and property interests are affected by a debtor's bankruptcy. In
93. These crimes are reprinted infra Appendix A.
94. Statute of Bankrupts, 1542, 34 & 35 Hen. 8, ch. 4 (Eng.). For a more extensive view of the
historical evolution of bankruptcy crimes, see COLLIER, supra note 3, 7A.01.
95. Sexton v. Dreyfus, 219 U.S. 339, 344 (1911) ("We take our bankruptcy system from England,
and we naturally assume that the fundamental principles upon which it was administered were adopted
by us when we copied the system, somewhat as the established construction of a law goes with words
where they are copied from by state."); F. REGIS NOEL, A HISTORY OF THE BANKRUPTCY CLAUSE OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 32, 124 (1919); HAROLD REMINGTON, A
TREATISE ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 2, at 5 (James M. Henderson ed.,
Lawyer's Cooperative, 5th ed. 1950). American and English law on criminal bankruptcy seems to have
diverged around 1870, with Englisli law emphasizing both the number and the penalty imposed. Current
law in the United Kingdom lists 69 bankruptcy offenses, the most serious of which carry seven year
prison terms. Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45, sched. 10 (Eng.).
96. 1898 Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, § 29(b), 30 Stat. 544 (repealed and transferred in 1948). As part
of its recodification of the Criminal Code in 1948, Congress moved § 29 from Title 11-the Bankruptcy
Code-to Title 18-the Criminal Code. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 689.
97. 1898 Bankruptcy Act, ch. 341, § 29, 30 Stat. 544 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 52 (repealed and
transferred in 1948)).
98. See infra Appendix B for a comparison of the provisions of § 727 of the Bankruptcy Code,
relating to denial of discharge, and § 152 of the Criminal Code, providing for various bankruptcy
crimes.
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particular, § 541 states that property of the estate includes "all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the
case," 99 as well as "[p]roceeds, product, offspring, rents, or profits of or
from property of the estate,"'0 0 and "[a]ny interest in property that the estate
acquires after commencement of the case."''
This breadth is intentional and has concrete implications. The automatic stay
prohibits any creditor from taking any collection action with respect to estate
property,0 2 and the administrative powers limit the debtor's right to use
estate property.'0 3 After full administration, creditors are paid only from
property of the estate.
0 4
For many of the crimes specified in § 152 through § 155, no bankruptcy
crime exists unless the property that is the subject of the indictment is
property of the bankruptcy estate. 0 5 A defendant can thus effectively defend
such actions by showing, for example, that the property concealed or
transferred was not property of the estate.
0 6
2. Transfer
Another example of a core concept is the term "transfer." Title 11 employs
a broad definition,0 7 used primarily in the definition of the Bankruptcy
Code's avoiding powers, including preferences'" and fraudulent trans-
fers.'0 9 These types of actions seek to ensure the type of equitable distribu-
tion anticipated in Title 11.
The word "transfer" appears twice in the text of bankruptcy crimes. The
seventh paragraph uses it to define certain transactions, " and § 153 uses
99. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).
100. Id. § 541(a)(6).
101. Id. § 541(a)(7); see also United States v. Moody, 923 F.2d 341, 349 (5th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 80 (1991), in which the court used § 541(c) of the Bankruptcy Code to determine
whether an interest in a spendthrift trust was estate property within the meaning of § 152.
102. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
103. Id. § 363(b).
104. Id. § 726.
105. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 152, para. 1 (1988) (concealment of estate property); id. para. 7 (transfer
or concealment of estate property); id. para. 8 (falsification or destruction of estate records); id. para.
9 (withholding estate records); id. § 153 (embezzlement of estate property); id. § 154, par. I (court
officer's purchase of estate property); id. para. 2 (court officer's refusal to permit inspection of estate
property); id. § 155 (fee fixing arrangements to be paid out of estate assets).
106. This determination is made by the factfinder. United States v. Weinstein, 834 F.2d 1454, 1461
(9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Moynagh, 566 F.2d 799, 803 (Ist Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
917 (1978); United States v. Butler, 704 F. Supp. 1338, 1344 (E.D. Va. 1989), af'd, 905 F.2d 1532 (4th
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 900 (1990).
107. 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) (1988) (."[TMransfer' means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or
conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in
property .... ").
108. Id. § 547.
109. Id. § 548.
110. 18 U.S.C. § 152.
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the term in defining embezzlement."' Criminal cases have tended to borrow
Title 1l's definition."
2
B. The Common Concepts
1. Denial of Discharge
Civil and criminal bankruptcy also share concepts. Included among these is
a concept which is at the core of civil bankruptcy: grounds for denial of
discharge. Many, but not all, of the acts which may form the basis of a denial
of discharge are the same or similar acts for which criminal penalties may lie.
For example, debtors who conceal assets or lie under oath not only may lose
their discharge, but also may be criminally prosecuted."'
The concept of discharge is central to civil bankruptcy. Discharge is close
to a right-the statute says that the debtor shall receive a discharge." 4
Those who receive a discharge may not be compelled to pay a pre-petition
debt."' Indeed, they may enjoin and receive compensation from those who
attempt to collect such debts." 6 Of course, the price for such a benefit is the
loss of all non-exempt property, which is paid pro rata to creditors." 7 As
a consequence, loss of the ability to receive a discharge effectively deprives
a debtor of much of the incentive to file bankruptcy.
There is a long, albeit not very well articulated, history of narrowly
construing exceptions to discharge." 8 The commission of bankruptcy crimes,
however, has always fit within this exception. Prior to 1978, the Bankruptcy
Act specifically referred to commission of a bankruptcy crime as a grounds
111. 18 U.S.C. § 153.
112. See United States v. Pfingst, 477 F.2d 177, 182-83 (2d Cir. 1973) (causing debtor to-purchase
shares of corporate stock of company under defendant's common control), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 941
(1973); Butler v. United States, 310 F.2d 214, 218-9 (9th Cir. 1962) (finding that the pre-petition sale
of debtor's cars combined with lack of full accounting of proceeds were sufficient to sustain the
conviction); United States v. Strauss, 283 F.2d 155, 158-59 (5th Cir. 1960) (holding that an allegation
of post-petition receipt, endorsement, and a negotiation of a check drawn on debtor were sufficient to
support an indictment under seventh paragraph); United States v. Switzer, 252 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1958)
(transfer of assets from troubled company who eventually became debtor to another, newer concern),
cert. denied, 357 U.S. 922 (1958).
113. See infra Appendix B (comparing the relevant portions of each statute).
114. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a).
115. Id. §§ 727(b) (scope of discharge), 524 (permanent injunction protecting discharge).
116. Id.
117. Id. § 726(b).
118. Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558, 562 (1915) ("In view of the well-known purposes of the
Bankrupt Law exceptions to the operation of a discharge thereunder should be confined to those plainly
dxpressed; and while much might be said in favor of extending these to liabilities incurred for services
obtained by fraud the language of the act does not go so far."); see also Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S.
18, 20 (1970); Murphy & Robinson Inv. Co. v. Cross (In re Cross), 666 F.2d 873, 879-80 (Former 5th
Cir. 1982).
Indeed, Congress made a conscious choice in the original text of the 1898 Act to distinguish the types
of unfavored acts. Earlier versions of the statute "eliminated... and have transferred [several criminal
offenses] to another part of the bill, making them grounds for refusing a discharge to the bankrupt."
H.R. REP. No. 65, 55th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1897) (reporting on section 29 of S. 1035, 55th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1897)).
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for denial of the discharge. When the 1978 Code was proposed, this was
changed and the discharge section paraphrased the relevant provisions of §
152. The apparent purpose of this change was to preserve the acts and mental
states required for bankruptcy crimes, but to allow them to be shown with a
lesser burden of proof."9 Although commission of a bankruptcy crime is not
the only basis for denial of a discharge, it remains a central one.
2. Fraudulent Transfers
Both civil and criminal bankruptcy seek to regulate fraudulent transfers. In
civil bankruptcy, these are transactions undertaken with the intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud creditors. 20 Such transactions can be avoided if they occur
within one year of bankruptcy. '2'
The seventh paragraph of § 152 of the Criminal Code also covers such
transfers. It states that a crime is committed by "[w]hoever ... in contempla-
tion of a case under title 11 by or against him ... knowingly and fraudulently
transfers or conceals any of his property .. ..'"" Thus, the two sections
cover some common ground, as in the case where a transaction is made pre-
petition with the intent to defraud another.12 1
119. "The fourth ground for denial of discharge is the commission of a bankruptcy crime, although
the standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt."
S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 98 (1978); H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 5, at 384.
120. State law also regulates such transfers. See UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER Acr § 4(a); 7A
U.L.A. 205 (1984). The lineage of such regulation runs deep. See An Acte Touchyng Orders for
Bankruptes, 13 Eliz., ch. 7 (1571) (Eng.); 50 Edw. 3, ch. 4 (1376-77) (Eng.).
121. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a). The representative of the estate also has standing to pursue causes of actions
that unsecured creditors of the debtors may have against others. Id. § 544(b). To the extent this includes
actions tnder the UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER AcT, the reach back period could be as long as four
years. U.F.T.A. § 9.
122. 18 U.S.C. § 152, para. 7.
123. Another common concept is one of administration by disinterested professionals. Criminal bank-
ruptcy, for example, has always been concerned with the potential for conflict of interest among
bankruptcy officials. Three of the eight original sections dealt directly with such officials, and §§ 153
to 155 of the current Criminal Code are their direct descendants.
Sections 153 and 154 of the Criminal Code deal, respectively, with the unauthorized use of estate
property by officers of the court and with the acquisition by such officers of estate property. Both
sections also deal with the hiding or destruction of documents related to or belonging to the estate. Id.
§§ 153, 154. In addition to prohibiting embezzlement, § 153 also prohibits unauthorized use or transfer
of estate property. Section 154 contains a flat prohibition on any officer of the estate purchasing,
"directly or indirectly," any property of the estate.
The civil analogues do not incorporate these terms. An officer of the court, such as a trustee or
examiner, can be removed "for cause." I I U.S.C. § 324(a). To be employed or to be paid, these officers
and their professionals must be and must remain disinterested. Id. § 327. Unlike denial of discharge, the
civil and criminal regulation of professionals seem to be hierarchical; that is, the Bankruptcy Code
permits broad regulation of professionals through the ability to dismiss for cause, and through the
regulation of compensation, while the Criminal Code regulates only the most extreme cases.
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III. FALSE AND TRUE SYNTHESES
As indicated in the previous section, the number and nature of common
terms and concepts is significant. The temptation is to find, or devise, some
interpretive scheme to mediate between the two. Lenity, given its prominence
and accessibility, is a prime candidate for this task. This section first attempts
to assess the applicability of the Court's recent decisions extending lenity into
the civil sphere to a hypothetical bankruptcy problem. This effort proves both
fairly easy and eminently plausible.
The next section explores the ramifications of this extension for administra-
tion of both civil and criminal bankruptcy. They are severe and adverse,
leading to a discussion of the ways in which the extension can and should be
prevented. After analyzing and dismissing several intermediate methods for
harmonizing administration of the two systems, the section next examines the
main cause of the problem: an attempt to construe common terms identically.
Although seemingly counterintuitive, I argue that courts must reject this
premise. I argue that from a historical, practical, and analytical perspective,
nothing compels identical construction, and that much mischief attends it.
The final section sorts out what doctrines and rules might be appropriate for
discrete points of intersection between civil and criminal bankruptcy.
A. The Argument for Extending Lenity to
the Bankruptcy Code
The similarities between civil and criminal bankruptcy provide at least a
plausible basis for the extension of lenity to the interpretation of the
Bankruptcy Code. Take, for example, the purchase by a business of the
unincorporated division of another company. Part of the consideration is the
acquirer's assumption of the unpaid debts related to the division; these
constitute some, but not all, of the seller's debts. After the transaction, the
buyer pays the assumed debts as they come due. The seller, however, falls on
hard times. It files for bankruptcy relief. Can the seller's bankruptcy trustee
recover as preferences payments made within ninety days of bankruptcy from
the holders of the assumed debt?
Most courts would allow recovery. Although no funds were transferred from
the debtor/seller to the creditors, many courts would find an "indirect
transfer."' 24 This entails recasting each payment into two transactions:
payments made first to the seller and then repayments to the creditors. So
reconstituted, there is the requisite "transfer" for preference law to apply. 2
May counsel for the creditors invoke lenity to avoid this result? The key
issue will be whether the transactions can be reshuffled to create a transfer of
124. See, e.g., Conrad Corp. v. Burton (In re Conrad Corp.), 806 F.2d 610 (5th Cir. 1986); Palmer
v. Radio Corp. of Am., 453 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1971); Aulick v. Largent, 295 F.2d 41 (4th Cir. 1961).
125. Alternatively, the court could construe the buyer's intangible obligation to pay the amounts of
the assumed debt to be property of the seller, and each payment made on account of that obligation a
transfer of that obligation from the seller to the creditor.
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the property of the debtor. The Bankruptcy Code adopts a broad definition of
transfer, 2 6 but recent cases suggest that this breadth may not be unlimited.
In Barnhill v. Johnson,'27 for example, the Court decided that a transfer
initiated by check occurs when the check is honored, not when the check is
delivered. 2 Part of the Court's reasoning in Barnhill is that many events
can occur between delivery and honor which would prevent the transfer of
funds. Barnhill also relies on state law to the effect that a check, by itself,
does not transfer funds.'29 But these can arguably be made applicable to the
hypothetical. If buyer's counsel makes explicit that the creditors are not
intended beneficiaries of the sale contract, they gain nothing upon its
execution. Further, many things can happen between assumption and payment;
say, for example, a reduction of the purchase price attributable to a breach of
various warranties which would lead to the contractual cessation of the
buyer's obligation to pay all of the debts assumed.
To the extent that Barnhill reveals ambiguity in the scope of the term
"transfer," lenity could resolve the dispute. Crandon states that "it is
appropriate to apply the rule of lenity in resolving any ambiguity in the ambit
of the statute's coverage" if "the governing standard is set forth in a criminal
statute."'' 30 Here, the same operative word is used in both statutes-transfer.
Moreover, the words were, at least from 1898 to 1948, part of the same
statute covering the same general topic of bankruptcy.' 31 It is thus not much
of a stretch to say that the criminal statute's text sets forth the "governing
standard."'' 32
Thompson/Center supports this extension. There, a plurality of the Court
noted that "[t]he key to resolving the ambiguity lies in recognizing that
although it is a tax statute that we construe now in a civil setting, the [statute
in question] has criminal applications that carry no additional requirements of
willfulness."'' 33 In the hypothetical above, any determination in a civil
126. 11 U.S.C. § 10 1(54) ("'[T]ransfer' means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional,
voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property ... .
127. Barnhill, 112 S. Ct. 1386 (1992).
128. Id. at 1390. As noted by Justice Stevens in dissent, this treatment is contrary to the treatment
of similar transactions under tax law. Id. at 1392 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 1389.
130. Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990); cf id. at 168 ("We are construing a
criminal statute and are therefore bound to consider application of the rule of lenity.").
131. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
132. At least two judges believe that Crandon can be extended to other civil cases. See United States
v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 588 (2d Cir. 1991) (arguing that the fact that there are criminal applications
in definitions of securities laws is relevant to whether the SEC exceeded authority in promulgating Rule
14e-3(a)) (Mahoney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992);
New Mexico v. Roswell Indep. Sch., 806 P.2d 1085, 1103 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991) ("Because [the statute
at issue] provides criminal penalties for violation of [other sections of the same statute], they are to be
strictly construed, even when applied in a civil context.") (citation omitted) (Hartz, J., specially
concurring).
133. United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 112 S. Ct. 2102, 2109 (1992). Justices Scalia and
Thomas joined the plurality on the lenity issue, and presumably concur with this standard. Id. at 2110
(Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment).
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setting of when a transfer occurs has "criminal applications" that do not impli-
cate an additional mental state. To see this, imagine the consequences in the
hypothetical above if a'civil court had previously ruled, on the same evidence,
that a transfer had not occurred. That ruling could then be precedent, in the
sense anticipated by Crandon and Thompson/Center, binding in the criminal
trial.
Further, in response to criticism by Justice Stevens that lenity was
inapplicable to a tax statute, the Thompson/Center plurality stated that other
than the focus on "criminal applications," they "kn[ew] of no other basis for
determining when the essential nature of a statute is 'criminal.' . . . The rule
of lenity, however, is a rule of statutory construction whose purpose is to help
give authoritative meaning to statutory language." '
Again, this rationale can be transported to the hypothetical. The assumed
facts could present criminal issues if the seller (now debtor) refused to
disclose the payments in its bankruptcy on the grounds that there was no
transfer made within the meaning of § 152 of the Criminal Code. With such
a transformation, the issue becomes one in which Barnhill might create
sufficient ambiguity-that is, make it "plausible" or "eminently debatable"
that a transfer of the debtor's property did not occur-to invoke lenity. The
"criminal applications" and attractiveness of a single construction become
apparent. Construction of "transfer" in the civil case thus has clear "criminal
applications," and it would be appropriate to use lenity in that civil setting to
give "authoritative meaning to statutory language."
B. Evaluating Extension
If the use of lenity to interpret civil bankruptcy statutes is plausible, it is
then appropriate to ask whether it is wise. On the positive side, such an
extension would provide a valuable tool-or at least a mechanical tie-
breaker-for the construction of the Bankruptcy Code. It could also regularize
the interpretation of common concepts and terms, thus reducing confusion in
cognate cases.
While these benefits are not trivial, they do not overcome serious problems
attendant to any extension of a criminal concept such as lenity into a civil
regulatory system. Among these problems is the thwarting of basic civil
bankruptcy policies such as maximum distribution to creditors and of the
equitable allocation of losses among creditors. Criminal bankruptcy could
suffer as well; the sheer volume of civil bankruptcy cases, if relevant to
criminal bankruptcy prosecutions, could overwhelm the development of a
consistent bankruptcy crimes doctrine.
134. Id. at 2110 n.10. The Court also states that lenity "is not a role of administration calling for
courts to refrain in criminal cases from applying statutory language that would have been held to apply
if challenged in civil litigation." Id. What the Court must assume here is that the same word should
mean the same thing regardless of its placement in a civil or criminal statute. Otherwise, the issue of
different treatment--of administrative regulation-would not arise.
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The best solution to this problem is also the simplest: do not apply lenity
in civil bankruptcy cases. This simple solution has hard consequences, not the
least of which is that embracing it commits one to the position that the same
word will have different applications depending on which code contains
it 135it. t~
To support this rejection of lenity, I first show that the policy implications
of acceptance are untenable. But policies are malleable, and the most this
argument will support is rejection of a pervasive acceptance of the doctrine;
periodic applications may still be shown to be consonant with particular
statements of these policies. Indeed, courts currently use an array of doctrines
and devices for distinguishing between criminal and civil bankruptcy. These
doctrines and devices, however, share a common flaw; they each assume that
the shared terms and concepts of civil and criminal bankruptcy do not have
different meanings depending on the code in which they are placed. While this
assumption holds, arguments for the application of lenity retain some
attractiveness, if not validity.
Elimination of the potential problem thus calls for rejection of Crandon's
and Thompson/Center's implicit assumption: that words used in similar
statutes must have the same meaning in each place in which they appear. In
short, I reject the notion that a word must have a uniform meaning and
application regardless of its context. Only if this notion is rejected can civil
and criminal bankruptcy evolve within their own particular contexts and best
serve their own particular policies. Moreover, the position that a word may
mean one thing in one statute and another in a second is supported by history,
practice, and reason. After first examining the adverse consequences of
extending lenity, I illustrate the application of these points.
C. False Readings
1. The Withering Array of Potential Interpretations
As indicated above, ten thousand civil bankruptcy cases are filed for each
criminal bankruptcy indictment that is commenced. 3 6 The disproportionate
ratio indicates a greater likelihood that the shared concepts and terms are
more likely to receive scrutiny in civil contexts than in criminal ones. It also
correlates with a higher gross number of misconstructions, however defined,
of the shared concepts. But if each of these interpretations is plausible or
135. We already tolerate this with respect to civil and criminal definitions of negligence. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts and the Model Penal Code, for example, each adopt different definitions
of negligence, each appropriate to their respective civil and criminal application. Compare RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 284 (defining negligence as "an act which the actor as a reasonable man
should recognize as involving an unreasonable risk of causing an invasion of an interest of anothef")
with MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(d) (defining negligence as: "A person acts negligently ... when he
should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk [and acts anyway). The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that the actor's failure to perceive it... involves a gross deviation from the standard
of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation.").
136. See supra note 10.
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eminently debatable,13 there may be an argument that the statute is
sufficiently ambiguous to invoke lenity.
As a consequence, every circuit split or other disagreement over the scope
of estate property or other common terms and concepts contains potential
defenses to criminal proceedings. These disparate readings provide a basis for
the existence of ambiguity, and ambiguity in the criminal context is a
predicate for lenity, especially since criminal cases-due to their relative
rarity and higher stakes-invite greater scrutiny of the statute's text. Were
there an understandable or principled test for determining ambiguity, this
problem might not exist. But no such test meets that standard, and thus the
potential for mischief is high.
There is another problem. The United States is often a creditor in civil
bankruptcies. It takes positions in these cases which affect its pecuniary
interests. These positions, however, may not be the same positions taken by
the government when exercising its discretion as to whether to seek an
indictment in similar situations. The issue can be illustrated by a Supreme
Court case, United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc. 35 There, the IRS seized a
business' assets pursuant to a tax lien. It sought to foreclose on the assets
seized to satisfy the debt secured. Before foreclosure, however, the debtor
commenced a bankruptcy case and immediately sought a turnover order under
§ 542 of the Bankruptcy Code, claiming that until foreclosure it had a right
of redemption in the assets. This redemption right was property of the estate,
and thus the debtor argued it should have the assets back.
The Court agreed, and forced the IRS to return the assets. While this ruling
potentially enlarges the assets available for creditors, it raises issues on the
criminal side. Say, for example, that prior to the decision in Whiting Pools a
secured creditor and a debtor colluded to keep certain assets from the reach
of creditors by a collusive repossession and foreclosure. 39 A bankruptcy is
filed prior to foreclosure and the debtor knowingly and fraudulently declines
to disclose the repossessed assets. If a criminal prosecution is later initiated,
could not the debtor invoke lenity? After all, the argument that the repos-
sessed assets were not property of the estate was the position of the United
States Government. Almost by definition, there are two plausible readings of
the statute.
The Court might address these concerns with its standard response:
difference among judges does not, by itself, create ambiguity. The problem
is that the Court has yet to articulate a reasoned fallback position; that is, one
that distinguishes genuine from false ambiguity. The problem endures.
137. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
138. Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. 198 (1983).
139. For a recent example of such a foreclosure, see Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Vantage
Steel Corp., 919 F.2d 206 (3d Cir. 1990).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
2. The Downward Spiral of Narrow Interpretation
Even if the Court develops a workable or principled standard for ambiguity,
there still are problems with extending lenity to civil bankruptcy. As indicated
above, lenity directs a court to adopt the narrower of two competing readings
of a statute. 4 ' If lenity applies to the interpretation of various Bankruptcy
Code terms or concepts, its application will inevitably result in a progression
of narrower and narrower readings of the Code. As each new conflict appears,
the result is pre-ordained, and pre-ordained in the direction of a constricted
construction. Especially in areas in which a broad reading is appropri-
ate-such as in the definition of estate property or in determining what
constitutes a transfer in civil bankruptcy-this sets up inevitable clashes of
policy.
Whiting Pools is again illustrative. It is easy and perhaps appropriate to
imagine the opposite outcome if the matter had arisen in a criminal context.
Assume, for example, that before the decision in Whiting Pools a private
secured party properly repossessed assets and then, in a subsequent bankrupt-
cy, refused to reveal their whereabouts to the trustee unless paid in full.' 4'
If a subsequent criminal prosecution were initiated for concealment of estate
property, 42 attorneys for the secured party could very well argue that the
assets were not estate property. After all, under non-bankruptcy law the
debtor's right of possession, and hence the trustee's, was contingent upon
satisfaction of the full amount of the secured obligation. 43 The trustee
would have responded with the argument adopted in Whiting Pools. In the
face of these two plausible readings, and in a criminal context, a court would
likely invoke lenity and hold that no estate property was concealed, and that
no crime was committed. Thereafter, the symmetrical logic of Crandon and
Thompson/Center, would influence, and probably change, the result in Whiting
Pools.
This problem of an increasing number of restrictive interpretations, and thus
the increasing number of potential policy clashes, exists even if the Court
develops a principled standard for ambiguity. So long as the common terms
and concepts can fit within any zone of ambiguity constructed, possibilities
for cross-influence exist. Given the centrality of the terms "estate property"
and "transfer," which affect each of the one million bankruptcies filed
annually, cases falling within the new zone of ambiguity will likely occur.
They will only need the concordance of a sufficient financial stake to be
litigated.
140. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
141. To avoid possible mens rea problems, assume that the secured party's position is that regardless
of the status of the assets as estate property, she will not turn over the assets until paid in full. This state
of mind will typically satisfy the mens rea requirement of § 152. COLLIER, supra note 3,
7A.02[1][a][iv].
142. 18 U.S.C. § 152, paras. 1, 7.
143. See U.C.C. § 9-506 (1991).
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Cases within the zone of ambiguity, however defined, sharpen the conflict
inherent in any extension of lenity to civil cases. Since the breadth of relief
in civil bankruptcy turns generally on an expansive reading of estate property
and the definition of transfer, and since lenity, if applicable, will direct a
court to adopt a restrictive approach, courts will increasingly find themselves
in the midst of dueling policies-one civil; the other criminal. The vice here
is that the criminal rule carries with it mechanical directions as to which of
the two competing readings to adopt. Consequently, if carried to its logical
extreme, this conflict will reduce all policy arguments to a single imperative:
adopt the narrower construction, regardless of the civil or criminal nature of
the suit in which the dispute occurs.
3. Smoke Screens
Courts are not unaware of these policy clashes. Indeed, the use of lenity as
a tie-breaker instead of a primary tool in the construction of statutes belies
lenity's somewhat mechanical application. To the extent, however, that courts
assume that words and concepts appearing in both the Bankruptcy and
Criminal Codes should mean the same, the problem is intractable. If the same
or similar words are given a uniform reading, lenity calls for the narrower
reading in case of ambiguity. One possible reason that this intractability has
not produced more discussion is that courts have employed a variety of
devices to avoid addressing the issue directly. They have distinguished cases
based upon a lack of sufficient disagreement, upon different burdens of proof,
and upon different requirements as to the mental state of the actors. As shown
below, none of these methods alters the basic assumption of identity of
construction. Thus each of them fails to be a compelling reason for not
applying lenity.
a. Disparate Opinions
Courts often assume that lenity is applicable, yet decline to employ it
because of a lack of true ambiguity. It has long been the position of the Court
that mere disagreement, by itself, is insufficient to invoke lenity.' 44 Thus,
to the extent that a lawyer argues for application of lenity in a criminal
context solely on the basis of divergent bankruptcy court opinions, that lawyer
has failed to make a sufficient showing that the court should use lenity.
If the Court had adopted a principled threshold for invocation of lenity, the
argument for rejection based upon insufficient indicia of ambiguity might be
persuasive. Yet, as indicated above, 145 no such threshold exists. Worse still,
it appears that a majority of the current Court would settle for a standard as
loose as plausibility or eminent debatability of construction.'46 Given the
144. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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explosion of reported bankruptcy cases, adroit counsel can often create a
plausible debate from advance sheets alone.
At most, the argument that text is insufficiently ambiguous is a cover for
other, unarticulated reasons for declining to use lenity. This argument is as
unprincipled as the method currently used to invoke lenity, and should be
rejected if other, principled, avenues exist.
b. Different Burdens of Proof
On occasion, courts will attempt to avoid the application of lenity in a civil
.case by referring to the fact that establishment of facts in criminal cases
requires a higher standard of proof. The interpretive issue is thought not to
arise in a civil context because civil courts will accept evidence as establish-
ing a fact-say a transfer or that certain assets are property of the estate-that
would be insufficient to establish those facts in a criminal trial. Again, this
does not avoid the ultimate issue of parallel construction; it simply accepts
that the words still mean the same thing, but asserts that the facts they
represent can be established by lesser or different evidence.
An example is United States v. Robbins.'47 There, an involuntary petition
had been filed against Robbins, a wheeler-dealer extraordinaire, in 1981. After
a protracted court battle, an order for relief was entered in 1983, but Robbins
still refused to cooperate. This caused confusion over what assets Robbins
held on the relevant date in 1981, and led to a turnover action, filed in 1986
but tried in 1988. Between 1986 and 1988, the bankruptcy court enjoined
Robbins from transferring any property at issue in the turnover action. 4
At the trial in 1988, the critical issue was whether the property Robbins
then held was "property of the estate." Robbins contended that it was the
trustee's burden "to show that each or any of defendants' present assets came
from assets [that] debtor had at the time of the bankruptcy before defendants
can be compelled to disgorge same.' 49 The court agreed, but allowed the
trustee to rely upon the doctrine of confusion of assets. Under this doctrine,
the trustee was entitled to rely upon a presumption, rebuttable by Robbins,
that all property held by Robbins was property of the estate. Robbins was
unable to rebut this presumption, and was ordered to turn over his assets.'50
Ultimately these assets proved sufficient to pay all pre-petition creditors in
full.15
1
The government then sought an indictment against Robbins for concealing
assets during the bankruptcy. In particular, it focused on assets transferred in
violation of the interim injunction. At the criminal trial, the government's sole
147. Robbins, 997 F.2d 390 (8th Cir. 1993). The facts are set forth in more detail in Evans v.
Robbins (In re Robbins), 83 B.R. 688 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988).
148. Robbins, 997 F.2d at 391-92.
149. In re Robbins, 83 B.R. at 692.
150. Id. at 693.
151. Id.
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evidence on whether these assets were "property of the estate" was the
testimony of the bankruptcy judge who had heard the turnover trial.'
The Eighth Circuit held that this was insufficient.5 3 In particular, it held
that: "when the doctrine of confusion of assets is relied upon in the underly-
ing adversary bankruptcy proceeding to prove the property -in issue is part of
the bankruptcy estate, the doctrine is not admissible in a subsequent criminal
prosecution to prove the same."'14 Its justification was that the different
burden of proof in the civil case made the findings from that case non-
transportable into the criminal trial. 5
This reasoning rings hollow for reasons which are explored in more detail
below. Its result, however, is inconsistent with its unarticulated main
premise-that "property of the estate" means the same thing in civil and in
criminal cases. Robbins had property taken from him and paid to his creditors
on the civil side. His concealment of that same property, however, did not
give rise to criminal liability, even though it would seem that once the
property was found to be "property of the estate" for one purpose, it should
be property of the estate for all purposes, including criminal liability.
In spite of their results, cases like Robbins still pursue the fiction that the
term "property of the estate" means the same thing in both statutes. They do
so under the guise of different burdens of proof. As stated in Robbins:
The quantum of proof necessary to sustain the bankruptcy court's finding
is less than that required for a criminal conviction .... [and] [b]ecause of
the different degrees of proof in civil and criminal cases, "findings of the
bankruptcy court that the assets were part of bankruptcy estate are [not]
controlling in the criminal case."' 56
This reasoning has a long and respected pedigree, although the Eighth
Circuit did not recognize it. Justice Jackson, in SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing
Corp.,"7 had given much the same response in the securities context. There,
the issue was whether a particular set of contractual arrangements were
"securities." If so, the SEC had regulatory power over their exchange, and
unregulated exchange was criminal. The added fact of criminal liability did
not constrain Justice Jackson from adopting a broad construction of the
definition. As he stated:
152. Robbins, 997 F.2d at 393.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 393-94.
156. Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Berry, 678 F.2d 856,
868 n.1O (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1066 (1985)). The court continued:
Finally, under the confusion of assets doctrine, the burden of proof is at all times on the
trustee; however, once a primafacie case is established, the burden of going forward is
on the bankrupt to desegregate the assets. If the bankrupt fails to refute the evidence, the
confused assets become assets of the bankruptcy estate. This is a far cry from requiring
the Government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal prosecution that the
postpetition property was acquired with prepetition assets or proceeds therefrom.
Id. at 394 (citations omitted).
157. Joiner, 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
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In the present case we do nothing to the words of the Act; we merely
accept them. It would be necessary in any case for any kind of relief to
prove that documents being sold were securities under the Act. In some
cases it might be [proved from the face of the document itself]. In others
proof must go outside the instrument itself as we do here. Where this proof
is offered in a civil action, as here, a preponderance of the evidence will
establish the case; if it were offered in a criminal case, it would have to
meet the stricter requirement of satisfying the jury beyond reasonable
doubt. "'8
This reasoning does not wash. It assumes that the term at issue--"securities"
in Joiner and "property of the estate" or "transfer" in bankruptcy-has the
same application in both contexts, and that what protects criminal defendants
is not the rule of lenity, but the difficulties in building a case that will
withstand the burden of proof in criminal cases.
This argument turns the considerations underlying lenity on their head. It
assumes, without discussion, that both statutes have the same or similar
purpose, which, as shown below, 59 is not the case with bankruptcy. While
the legislative purpose behind criminal bankruptcy is complementary to civil
bankruptcy, it is certainly not the same. This argument also muddles lenity's
policy of notice. If notice to potential criminal defendants is the touchstone
of lenity, cases such as Robbins which give common terms a Janus-like
character confuse rather than clarify-in essence, they assume that identical
words mean the same thing regardless of context, but then reach different
results anyway.
c. Different Mental State Requirements
Recent lenity cases have focused on an aligned but distinct point. In
Thompson/Center, the Court relied in part on the absence of a culpable mental
state as a factor in exercising lenity.' 6° In brief, the argument is that because
the defendant does not have the added protection of a good faith or a pure
motive type of defense, there is more reason to opt for a strict construc-
tion.16'
This argument, however, begins with the premise that equal construction is
the rule. If not, a crime's mens rea element could be viewed as a distinguish-
ing characteristic between the civil and criminal statutes; one would need a
strict construction of a civil statute only if the mens rea requirement did not
adequately sort conduct deemed criminal from legitimate activity. Moreover,
the notice requirement is lacking as well; Thompson/Center's procedural
context is testament to the availability of declaratory and other interpretive
relief. And with respect to bankruptcy crimes, this issue is a false one. Many
158. Id. at 355.
159. See infra notes 170-76 and accompanying text.
160. United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 112 S. Ct. 2102, 2109 (1992).
161. Indeed, the Court has stated that in the absence of Congressional guidance, it will infer a mens
rea requirement if none is stated. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437 (1978).
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cases have held that not only must the property concealed or transferred be
estate property, but the defendant must have known of its character and of the
wrongful nature of his or her actions. 62 As a consequence, a lack of
knowledge on the part of the defendant distinguishes many cases. But a
significant number remain. Participants in schemes to hide or conceal assets
often undertake such actions without regard to the legal status of the property
concealed or transferred.
63
In this sense, both Crandon and Thompson/Center reflect an awareness of
Congress' ability to create crimes that do not incorporate traditional notions
of mens rea. 64 In Crandon, the statute made payment and receipt of
supplemental pay the crime; the defendant's mental state was irrelevant.'
65
So too in Thompson/Center; simply "mak[ing]" the regulated rifle without
registration would have been sufficient to impose criminal liability, regardless
of any good faith or lack of knowledge of the criminality of the act.
166
All this means, however, is that the Court was directly confronted with the
need to resolve an ambiguity, and could not rely on the defendant's ability to
defeat a prosecution based upon a showing of a lack of specific intent. Its
response was indirect. In order to determine what the statute meant in a civil
context, it looked to what a person would have to know to be convicted in a
criminal context. It then reasoned back from what a person would have to do
to be convicted of a similar statute in order to set the boundaries of the term
at issue in the civil case. By so reaching out to apply lenity, the Court was
simply addressing the mental state issue before it was strictly necessary to do
SO.
D. True Views
1. Lenity Inapplicable to Civil Bankruptcy
One way to address the potential problems is simply to deny that lenity has
anything to do with interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code. This has the
salutary benefit of avoiding all dispute about the issue. It also has some basis
in reason. The Bankruptcy Code is a civil regulatory system, not a criminal
statute. Almost by definition, lenity is not applicable since, strictly speaking,
no court interpreting the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code would be
construing a penal statute.
Crandon and Thompson/Center, however, seem to relax this requirement.
They do so, however, only because they proceed upon an unarticulated
premise that is suspect. That premise may be that terms common to civil and
criminal regulation should have exactly the same meaning in each; that is,
they should be read to cover exactly the same activities. In the traditional
162. COLLIER, supra note 3, 7A.02[l][a][ii], at 7A-32.
163. This mental state is sufficient for § 152. Id. at 7A.02[l][a][iv].
164. On this tendency, see Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 437-38.
165. Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 154 n.1 (1990).
166. United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 112 S. Ct. 2102, 2109 (1992).
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jargon of statutory construction, the two statutes should be construed in pari
materia. I question the accuracy and necessity of this premise, especially in
the context of bankruptcy. A review of the history and purpose of the doctrine
of in pari materia shows that such a result is not compelled, or appropriate,
in the case of bankruptcy.
a. Consistent with In Pari Materia
It is a feature of statutory construction that courts give effect to the intent
of the legislature as expressed in its words. 67 Interpretive guidance is
provided by other statutes only if they are connected in some way.'6 8 The
doctrine of in pari materia attempts to capture this insight. A thesis of this
Article, however, is that words common to the Criminal and the Bankruptcy
Codes should receive different interpretations depending on the nature of the
case. One could even say that the words will "mean" different things or have
different definitions. In concrete terms, a particular asset may be "property of
the estate" and administered accordingly in a civil bankruptcy, yet not be
"estate property" and provide the jurisdictional basis for a criminal case.
Some may object that this violates the interpretive maxim that statutes in
pari materia should be construed together. But as Karl Llewellyn once
demonstrated, every interpretive maxim has its limiting maxim."" And it is
a limitation on the doctrine of in pari materia that statutes that do not share
a common scope or purpose, or that evince a legislative design to depart from
one another, are not to be construed together.
Criminal and civil bankruptcy, while sharing a common subject, do not
share common goals and have a different legislative design. Civil bankruptcy
promotes creditor recovery, a fresh start for worthy debtors, and reorganiza-
tions for deserving businesses. 71 Criminal bankruptcy, in contrast, is not
concerned with individual loss or even whether certain acts caused anyone
particularized harm. 7' Instead, the statutes establishing federal bankruptcy
crimes seek to prevent and redress abuses of the bankruptcy system. 172
167. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory ofAppellate Decision and the Rule or Canons About
How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 400 (1950) (listing 28 canons of statutory
construction and an equal number of exceptions).
168. Id. at 402.
169. See id. at 401-06 & nn.13-14.
170. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
171. See, e.g., Stegeman v. United States, 425 F.2d 984, 986 (9th Cir. 1970) (en banc), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 837 (1970) ("[Section 152] was enacted to serve important interests of government, not merely
to protect individuals who might be harmed by the prohibited conduct.").
172. United States v. Grant, 971 F.2d 799, 805 (1st Cir. 1992) ("Section 152 promotes efficient
bankruptcy administration and an equitable allocation of the assets of debtor estates by criminalizing
efforts to preempt a neutral and informed assessment by the trustee as to the status and the value of the
debtor's legal, equitable and possessory interests in property at the commencement of the case.")
(emphasis in original); Stuhley v. Hyatt, 667 F.2d 807, 809 n.3 (9th Cir. 1982) ("IT]he principle
objectives of the provisions are to prevent and punish efforts by a bankrupt to avoid the distribution of
any part of a liable bankrupt estate."); United States v. Shapiro, 101 F.2d 375, 379 (7th Cir. 1939), cert.
denied, 306 U.S. 657 (1939) ("The object of Congress in passing this criminal statute was to punish
those debtors who, although wanting relief from their debts, did not want to surrender what property
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Thus, most bankruptcy crimes do not require the acts proscribed to be
material, 7 3 do not require that the defendant benefit in any way,7 4 and
do not require that any creditor be injured.17 1 In short, criminal bankruptcy
does not seek to regulate any particular debtor/creditor relationship; instead,
it sets basic rules for participation in the bankruptcy process generally.
It might be objected that while there are different goals, they are comple-
mentary; if criminal bankruptcy's concern is the protection of the civil
system's integrity, should not the interpretation of similar terms be given the
same extension so as to mutually reinforce each other? So stated, the
objection appears strong. But the objection is overstated. To the extent
criminal bankruptcy protects civil bankruptcy, it protects excesses and abuses
of that system, a function which can be performed without invoking lenity.
Indeed, civil bankruptcy as a regulatory system should be free to seek
expansive remedies aimed at each individual state of affairs. And there are
some acts which are offensive to the civil system, but which are not criminal;
this was recognized by Congress in 1898 when it apportioned acts between
crimes and grounds for denial of discharge.
7 6
The departure from in pari materia may seem radical. But it is not. It is
supported not only by common sense, but by history. Take, for example, the
case of Bones v. Booth. 77 Bones and Booth had been engaged in playing
"all-fours for two guineas a game, from Monday evening to Tuesday evening,
without any interruption, except for an hour or two at dinner [they] never
parted company."' At the end of the game, Bones owed Booth seventeen
guineas.'79 Bones paid, and then sued to recover part of it, relying upon a
criminal statute which made illegal the loss at gambling of ten pounds or
more "at one time or sitting."'' 0 The issue was whether dinner had
intervened sufficiently so as to say that the loss was not all at one time. The
court noted the dual nature of the statute; penal when "brought by a common
informer," but remedial when brought by the party injured.' To give effect
to the remedial nature of the statute, the court found that dinner did not
constitute sufficient intervention, but noted that it might come to a different
result if a "common informer" had brought the action seeking to impose the
criminal penalty, which was to be put in a pillory for a stated time. 82
there was to creditors.").
173. Grant, 971 F.2d at 809 & n.3.
174. United States v. Weinstein, 834 F.2d 1454, 1462 (9th Cir. 1987).
175. United States v. O'Donnell, 539 F.2d 1233, 1237 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 960
(1976); United States v.- Klupt, 475 F.2d 1015, 1018-19 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Mathies, 350
F.2d 963 (3d Cir. 1965).
176. See supra note 96, and accompanying text.
177. Bones, 96 Eng. Rep. 721 (C.P. 1788).
178. Id.
179. A guinea is one pound and a shilling.
180. An Act for the Better Preventing of Ecessive and Deceitful Gaming, 1709, 9 Anne, ch. 14
(Eng.) (providing for punishment by pillory).
181. Bones, 96 Eng. Rep. at 722 (Nares, J.).
182. Id. (Gould & Blackstone, JJ., concurring).
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Other cases were similar, holding in effect that "there is no impropriety in
putting a strict construction on a penal clause, and a liberal construction on
a remedial clause, in the same act."'1 3 This approach continues to be used
by American common law courts, 8 4 by United States federal courts
construing non-criminal federal statutes,185 and on occasion by the Supreme
Court itself. 6
Giving the same term different constructions in different settings also better
describes what courts are already doing, albeit under different names. Robbins
is a good example of a court's reliance on procedural justifications to avoid
the more basic issue: that it makes sense to have the terms take different
meanings in each statute. Each time a court invokes one of these procedural
devices, it accomplishes the same result as if the terms were construed
differently, but leaves open the possibility of a different construction at a later
time. This seems at odds with one of lenity's main justifications-that of
providing notice to citizens of what acts Congress has prohibited. In a
183. Short v. Hubbard, 130 Eng. Rep. 340, 344 (C.P. 1824); see also DwARRIs, supra note 30 at
262; ENDLICH, supra note 12, § 322.
184. Compare State v. Simmons, 327 A.2d 843, 844 (R.I. 1974) (stating that the phrase "any injury
to the person... of another" in criminal statute refers only to actual bodily harm and not to injury to
reputation alone) with McDonald v. Brown, 51 A. 213, 214 (R.I. 1902) (finding that libel judgment was
nondischargeable because "[w]ounded feelings, mental anguish, loss of social position and standing,
personal mortification and dishonor, are clearly injuries that pertain to the person."); see also City of
Madison v. Hyland, Hall & Co., 243 N.W.2d 422 (Wis. 1976) (stating that antitrust laws are to be
construed broadly when considering standing to redress restraint of trade; narrowly when applying penal
consequences), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 953 (1976); People v. Vetri, 131 N.E.2d 568, 571 (N.Y.
1955) (holding that an accrued vacation is pay, not "wages" within meaning of statute making the
payment of wages more than one week after earned, but wages for other purposes, including workers'
compensation and bankruptcy); State v. Meinken, 91 A.2d 721 (N.J. 1952) (finding that fish and game
laws are to be construed liberally when in furtherance of policy and regulatory power, narrowly when
criminal action is involved); see also supra note 135.
185. See Georgetown University Hospital v. Sullivan, 934 F.2d 1280, 1284-85 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(holding that the phrase "amount in controversy" has different meaning in different parts of the Medicare
statute depending upon the purpose served); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 673 F.2d 400, 403 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that the phrase "effluent limitation
or other limitation" may have a different meaning in the section of the Clean Water Act dealing with
judicial review of the Administrator's action than they do in the section dealing with citizen suits
because of the "very different purposes served" by the two sections), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 879 (1982);
McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 617 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that although the words "any State
or Territory" do not include the District of Columbia for purposes of defining whose officials will have
liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, they do include the District of Columbia for purposes of defining what
conspiracies will be covered by 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2)), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 983 (1981). Compare
Domanus v. United States, 961 F.2d 1323 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that "willfully" has different
meanings in civil and criminal tax proceedings) with Malouche v. JH Mgmt. Co., Inc., 839 F.2d 1024
(4th Cir. 1988) (holding that "willfully" has the same meaning in criminal and civil wiretapping statute).
186. See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 962 n.8 (1988); United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 442, 443 n.19 (1978), (quoting Senator Sherman's comments regarding
construction of remedial statutes broadly and of penal statutes narrowly in context of penal laws); United
States v. Raynor, 302 U.S. 540, 547-48 (1939); Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S.
427, 433 (1932); Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60, 65 (1916) ("The same words may have different
meanings in different parts of the same act, and of course words may be used in a statute in a different
sense from that in which they are used in the Constitution.') (Holmes, J.); American Security & Trust
Co. v. Commissioners of the District of Columbia, 224 U.S. 491,494 (1912) ("But it needs no authority
to show that the same phrase may have different meanings in different connections.") (Holmes, J.).
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perverse way, the failure to admit different interpretations perpetuates
ambiguity in a way that adopting different meanings would not.
A more natural construction would be to give each statute a similar, but
separate reading; in formal terms, the criminal interpretations would be sub-
sets of the larger interpretations applicable in civil cases. This may be another
way of saying that in criminal matters statutes should be construed strictly,
and in civil matters statutes should be construed liberally. This being said,
however, one must also accept that the product of such construction is
different meanings for the same words.
b. Lenity's Concerns Not Implicated
The different functions Congress accorded civil and criminal bankruptcy is
also consistent with the two policies underlying lenity. It is part of Congress'
function to select carefully those acts which will result in a denial to the
debtor of the benefits of the civil system-that is, a denial of discharge-and
those acts which are criminal.'87 Giving full effect to both systems by
declining to impose upon one the policies of another as expressed in the
similar terms they use thus gives effect to the separation of powers concern
by fully implementing Congress' design.
The notice function is served as well. By leaving courts free to construe
common and similar terms and concepts narrowly in criminal cases, no
defendant can claim a lack of notice to the extent that courts consistently
interpret the bankruptcy crime statutes. Indeed, to the extent that civil
bankruptcy is free to produce expansive interpretations of common terms,
there will be outer guideposts as to conduct. In addition, lenity's notice
function is not as important in civil bankruptcy. Bankruptcy relief can be
viewed as an act of legislative grace. The denial of discharge due a broad
interpretation simply returns the parties to nonbankruptcy law, a state that
existed for most of the nineteenth century in this country. 88 This conse-
quence is unlike broad interpretation in criminal cases where the result would
be the imposition of criminal penalties.
Finally, to the extent that lenity incorporates notions of gingerly labelling
conduct as socially inappropriate, these concerns are not present in bankrupt-
cy. Filing bankruptcy is, in the vast majority of cases, a voluntary act.'89
Social opprobrium, to the extent that it exists, vests primarily in the filing and
discharge; indeed, denial of a discharge simply means that creditors may
continue to pursue the debtor until they are paid in full.
Dissimilar interpretation would not cause great disruption in the areas of
intersection between the two systems. Take, for example, the denial of a
discharge. While it is true that the text which states conditions for denial is
187. Congress made this distinction when enacting the current bankruptcy crimes statute. See supra
note 118.
188. There was no federal bankruptcy legislation from 1804 to 1841, from 1843 to 1867, and from
1878 to 1898. COLLIER, supra note 3, 7A.01[1][6].
189. See supra note 10.
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almost the same as the criminal provisions, 90 the concerns of lenity are not
met by its extension in such cases. First, the structure of discharge leads to
similar interpretive strategies. Discharge is close to a right-the statute says
that the debtor shall receive a discharge' 91-and there is a long, albeit not
very well articulated, history of narrowly construing exceptions to dis-
charge. 92 While this may seem at first blush to be the same as lenity, it is
not. Narrow construction is simply a factor in a balancing test; it can be
outweighed by other policy considerations. Lenity, on the other hand, is a
direction on the result to select after finding ambiguity. In civil bankruptcy,
then, while the purpose is to achieve discharge, it does not have the blindness
present in lenity. Other factors may matter.
c. Summary
The tension that exists between civil and criminal bankruptcy turns on the
assumption that similar terms in each statute need to be construed the same.
As noted above, I question and reject this premise. The two systems have
different goals; civil bankruptcy is a collective proceeding which attempts to
bring all affected parties together to solve a collective problem. While
criminal bankruptcy's main goal is the protection of the integrity of this
collective system, its focus is on a two party adversarial setting: the
government and the individual. It may well be the case that procedures and
presumptions appropriate to civil bankruptcy do not transplant well into
criminal bankruptcy-both Robbins and Barnhill may be examples of this
phenomena.
A consequence of the view that lenity does not apply is that, at some level
and in some cases, words used in the Bankruptcy Code will have a different
extension than the same words used in the Criminal Code. As in Robbins,
concealment of assets found to be property of the estate in the civil case may
not give rise to criminal liability. This certainly does not work to the civil
system's disadvantage-it preserves the ability to broadly construe the
Bankruptcy Code to achieve its goals. It potentially constricts criminal
prosecutions, but given the general mental state requirements for bankruptcy
fraud, it would be hard to establish this as an empirical fact.
2. Civil Bankruptcy Largely Irrelevant to Lenity
Even if lenity is not extended to interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code, the
converse problem still exists: to what extent should interpretations of the
Bankruptcy Code affect administration of the Criminal Code? After all, every
time an issue is considered by the Supreme Court, at least several lower
190. See infra Appendix B for a comparison.
191. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a).
192. Since at least 1915, the Court has narrowly construed exceptions to discharge. Gleason v. Thaw,
236 U.S. 558 (1915); see also supra note 118.
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courts have differed on its resolution. And as the opening example of Barnhill
shows, if the question revolves around a common concept, there can be
significant implications.
Phrased in the argot of lenity, the issue is whether disparate interpretations
of the Bankruptcy Code create the ambiguity necessary to invoke lenity. Most
lenity cases dismiss the automatic invocation of lenity upon such a showing,
and appropriately so. But can such interpretations be factors in a finding of
lenity? Here, the two functions of lenity split. The notice function, for
example, calls strongly for application-how can a term be said to be clear
and easy to follow if several federal judges disagree over its scope?
But the separation of powers issue cuts the other way. To the extent that the
construction of the Bankruptcy Code is motivated by differing degrees of
intent to further the collective goals of bankruptcy, the dispute is on grounds
largely irrelevant to criminal administration. Whiting Pools may present one
such case; Robbins another.
In the final analysis, differing interpretations cannot be ignored, but they
cannot be given great weight either. If someone had attempted to conceal a
repossessed asset prior to Whiting Pools, an argument could exist that a crime
had been committed, since at that point courts had not resolved whether such
pensions were estate property. But any criminal prosecution would focus on
the defendant's mental state-what did she know, and when did she know
it-to see if there was a knowing and fraudulent concealment. This would,
without affecting what property of the estate covered, accomplish the same
goals as an application of lenity, but would confine the result to the individual
case, rather than setting precedent for all future cases.'93
CONCLUSION
The Court's recent extension of lenity into areas of law with both civil and
criminal components has potentially grave implications for bankruptcy. Given
the number and nature of concepts and terms shared by civil and criminal
bankruptcy, inappropriate or unduly restrictive construction of these items can
lessen the efficacy of both systems.
The different aims of civil and criminal bankruptcy provide a basis for
courts to resist extending lenity principles to the interpretation of the
Bankruptcy Code. The cost of this is that courts will have to recall that words
used in one code will have different coverage in another, but this is a small
price to pay for an effective civil system, on the one hand, and a fair criminal
system, on the other.
Moreover, courts should also resist invoking lenity in criminal bankruptcy
cases based solely upon differing construction by civil courts. Although such
disagreement can undeniably be a factor in some cases, disagreement over the
scope of terms in the Bankruptcy Code may be caused by consideration
193. The current relationship between civil and criminal bankruptcy is set forth in COLLIER, supra
note 3, 7A.05E3][c].
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irrelevant to criminal administration. Also, given the number of bankruptcy
cases, some of the interpretations may just be wrong.
Although prior in time and function to the current civil bankruptcy system,
criminal bankruptcy has now receded in its day-to-day significance. To allow
results from the handful of criminal cases to affect and constrict the civil
relief available under the Bankruptcy Code would be both bad doctrine and
bad policy. There are better ways to interpret statutes.
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APPENDIX A
18 U.S.C. § 152, PARA. 1 (CONCEALMENT) Whoever knowingly and
fraudulently conceals from a custodian, trustee, marshal, or other officer of
the court charged with the control or custody of property, or from creditors
in any case under title 11, any property belonging to the estate of a debtor;
18 U.S.C. § 152, PARA. 2 (FALSE OATHS AND ACCOUNTS) Whoever
knowingly and fraudulently makes a false oath or account in or in relation
to any case under title 11;
18 U.S.C. § 152, PARA. 3 (FALSE DECLARATIONS AND VERIFICATIONS)
Whoever knowingly and fraudulently makes a false declaration, certificate,
verification, or statement under penalty of perjury as permitted under
section 1746 of title 28, United States Code, in or in relation to any case
under title 11;
18 U.S.C. § 152, PARA. 4 (PRESENTING OR USING FALSE CLAIMS) Whoever
knowingly and fraudulently presents any false claim for proof against the
estate of a debtor, or uses any such claim in any case under title 11,
personally, or by agent, proxy, or attorney, or as agent, proxy, or attorney;
18 U.S.C. § 152, PARA. 5 (RECEIVING MATERIAL AMOUNTS OF PROPERTY
FROM A DEBTOR WITH INTENT TO DEFEAT PROVISIONS OF TITLE 11)
Whoever knowingly and fraudulently receives any material amount of
property from a debtor after the filing of a case under title 11, with intent
to defeat the provisions of title 11;
18 U.S.C. § 152, PARA. 6 (BRIBERY) Whoever knowingly and fraudulently
gives, offers, receives or attempts to obtain any money or property,
remuneration, compensation, reward, advantage, or promise thereof, for
acting or forbearing to act in any case under title 11;
11 U.S.C. § 152, PARA. 7 (TRANSFER OR CONCEALMENT OF PROPERTY TO
DEFEAT PROVISIONS OF TITLE 11) Whoever, either individually or as an
agent or officer of any person or corporation, in contemplation of a case
under title 11 by or against him or any other person or corporation, or with
intent to defeat the provisions of title 11, knowingly and fraudulently
transfers or conceals any of his property or the property of such other
person or corporation;
18 U.S.C. § 152, PARA. 8 (PO.ST-PETITION TAMPERING WITH RECORDED
INFORMATION) Whoever, after the filing of a case under title 11 or in
contemplation thereof, knowingly and fraudulently conceals, destroys,
mutilates, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any recorded information,
including books, documents, records, and papers, relating to the property
or financial affairs of a debtor;
18 U.S.C. § 152, PARA. 9 (POST-PETITION WITHHOLDING OF RECORDED
INFORMATION) Whoever, after the filing of a case under title 11, knowingly
and fraudulently withholds from a custodian, trustee, marshal, or other
officer of the court entitled to its possession, any recorded information,
including books, documents, records, and papers, relating to the property
or financial affairs of a debtor.
Section 152 of title 18 provides a five-year maximum term of imprison-
ment. 94 While § 152 also provides for a fine of only $5000, other
legislation has increased that amount to $250,000.95 The amount may be
194. 18 U.S.C. § 152.
195. Id. § 3571(b)(3).
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increased to $500,000 if the defendant is an organization,' 96 and may also
be increased depending upon pecuniary gain or loss from the crime. '97The
actual penalty imposed is determined in accordance with the Sentencing
Guidelines promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission.98
Other bankruptcy crime statutes include:
18 U.S.C. § 153 (EMBEZZLEMENT BY OFFICER OF COURT) Whoever
knowingly and fraudulently appropriates to his own use, embezzles, spends,
or transfers any property or secretes or destroys any document belonging
to the estate of a debtor which came into his charge as trustee, custodian,
marshal, or other officer of the court, shall be fined not more than $5000
or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 154 (PURCHASE OF ESTATE PROPERTY BY OFFICER OR
REFUSAL OF PERMISSION TO INSPECT) Whoever, being a custodian, trustee,
marshal, or other officer of the court, knowingly purchases, directly or
indirectly, any property of the estate of which he is such officer in a case
under title 11; orWhoever being such officer, knowingly refuses to permit a reasonable
opportunity for the inspection of the documents and accounts relating to the
affairs of estates in his charge by parties in interest when directed by the
court to do so-
Shall be fined not more than $500, and shall forfeit his office, which
shall thereupon become vacant.
18 U.S.C. § 155 (AGREEMENTS FIXING FEES OR COMPENSATION TO BE
PAID TO ATTORNEYS OR OTHER PARTIES IN INTEREST) Whoever, being a
party in interest, whether as a debtor, creditor, receiver, trustee or
representative of any of them, or attorney for any such party in interest, in
any receivership or case under title 11 in any United States court or under
its supervision, knowingly and fraudulently enters into any agreement,
express or implied, with another such party in interest or attorney for
another such party in interest, for the purpose of fixing the fees or other
compensation to be paid to any party in interest or to any attorney for any
party in interest for services rendered in connection therewith, from the
assets of the estate, shall be fined not more than $5000 or imprisoned not
more than one year, or both.
196. Id. § 3571(c)(3).
197. Id. § 3571(d) (providing for a maximum fine equal to twice the pecuniary gain or loss involved
in a crime if the calculation of such gain or loss "would [not] unduly complicate or prolong the
sentencing process").
198. COLLIER, supra note 3, 7A.05[4].
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APPENDIX B
COMPARISON OF SECTION 727 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
AND SECTION 152 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE
PROVISION OF SECTION 152
(Grounds for conviction of crime)
18 U.S.C. § 152, PARA. 1
Whoever knowingly and fraudu-
lently conceals from a custodian,
trustee, marshal, or other officer
of the court charged with the
control or custody of property, or
from creditors in any case under
title 11, any property belonging to
the estate of a debtor;
18 U.S.C. § 152, PARA. 7
Whoever, either individually or as
an agent or officer of any person
or corporation, in contemplation
of a case under title 11 by or
against him or any other person or
corporation, or with intent to
defeat the provisions of title 11,
knowingly and fraudulently trans-
fers or conceals any of his proper-
ty or the property of such other
person or corporation;
18 U.S.C. § 152, PARA. 2
Whoever knowingly and fraudu-
lently makes a false oath or ac-
count in or in relation to any case
under title 11;
18 U.S.C. § 152, PARA. 3
Whoever knowingly and fraudu-
lently makes a false declaration,
certificate, verification, or state-
ment under penalty of perjury as
permitted under section 1746 of
title 28, United States Code, in or
in relation to any case under title
11;
PROVISION OF SECTION 727
(Grounds for denial of discharge)
11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)
the debtor, with intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud a creditor or an
officer of the estate charged with
custody of property under this
title, has transferred, removed,
destroyed, mutilated, or con-
cealed, or has permitted to be
transferred, removed, destroyed,
mutilated, or concealed-(A)
property of the debtor, within one
year before the date of the filing
of the petition; or (B) property of
the estate, after the date of the
filing of the petition;
11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A)
the debtor knowingly and fraudu-
lently, in or in connection with
the case-(A) made a false oath
or account;
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18 U.S.C. § 152, PARA. 4 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(B)
Whoever knowingly and fraudu- the debtor knowingly and fraudu-
lently presents any false claim for lently, in or in connection with
proof against the estate of a debt- the case-(B) presented or used a
or, or uses any such claim in any false claim;
case under title 11, personally, or
by agent, proxy, or attorney, or as
agent, proxy, or attorney;
18 U.S.C. § 152, PARA. 6 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(C)
Whoever knowingly and fraudu- the debtor knowingly and fraudu-
lently gives, offers, receives or lently, in or in connection with
attempts to obtain any money or the case-(C) gave, offered, re-
property, remuneration, compen- ceived, or attempted to obtain
sation, reward, advantage, or money, property, or advantage, or
promise thereof, for acting or a promise of money, property, or
forbearing to act in any case advantage, for acting or forbear-
under title 11; ing to act;
18 U.S.C. § 152, PARA. 8
Whoever, after the filing of a case
under title 11 or in contemplation
thereof, knowingly and fraudu-
lently conceals, destroys, muti-
lates, falsifies, or makes a false
entry in any recorded information,
including books, documents, re-
cords, and papers, relating to the
property or financial affairs of a
debtor;
18 U.S.C. § 152, PARA. 9.
Whoever, after the filing of a case
under title 11, knowingly and
fraudulently withholds from a.
custodian, trustee, marshal, or
other officer of the court entitled
to its possession, any recorded
information, including books,
documents, records, and papers,
relating to the property or finan-
cial affairs of a debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(D)
the debtor knowingly and fraudu-
lently, in or in connection with
the case-(D) withheld from an
officer of the estate entitled to
possession under this title, any
recorded information, including
books, documents, records, and
papers, relating to the debtor's
property or financial affairs;
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